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Critics of pay or play mandates, borrowing from the large empirical minimum wage literature, provide
evidence that they reduce employment.  Borrowing from a smaller empirical minimum wage literature,
we provide evidence that they also are a blunt instrument for funding health insurance for the working
poor. The vast majority of those who benefit from pay or play mandates which require employers to
either provide appropriate health insurance for their workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the
cost of health care live in families with incomes twice the poverty line or more and, depending on
how coverage is determined, the mandate will leave a significant share of the working poor ineligible
















President Clinton spoke for the vast majority of Americans when he said “those who 
work hard and play by the rules should not live in poverty.” (Clinton, 1995)  The same can be 
said with respect to access to health insurance. What is more controversial is whether socially 
motivated legislation to increase the minimum wage or to mandate employer provided health 
insurance coverage will achieve their stated goals of reducing poverty or increasing  health 
insurance coverage and second, are there more effective means of doing so?  These two 
fundamental policy questions were asked by Stigler (1946) in the first modern evaluation of 
minimum wage policies.  After 60 years, the preponderance of evidence, confirms Stigler’s 
original responses of no and yes to these questions. The great majority of the empirical minimum 
wage literature has focused on how much minimum wage increases reduce employment.  Until 
1995, the consensus was that minimum wage increases significantly reduced the employment of 
teenagers and other low skilled workers. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) and Brown (1988) 
summarize this literature and find that a 10 percent minimum wage increase led to a reduction in 
teenage employment in the range of 1 to 3 percent (a wage elasticity of -0.1 to -0.3).  Card and 
Krueger (1995) in their iconoclastic book, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage, demonstrate the weakness of this earlier empirical literature and present 
evidence that led them to conclude that minimum wage increases have no significant negative 
effect on the employment of teenagers and other low skilled workers and might even increase 
their employment.   
As a result of these findings, a major new literature has attempted to estimate the wage 
elasticity of minimum wage increases. A decade after Card and Krueger (1995) the 
preponderance of this new evidence supports the consensus view held prior to 1995 that 
minimum wage increases have a small but significant negative (in the range of -0.1 to -0.3)   3
employment effect on teenagers and other low skilled workers.  For examples see: Currie and 
Fallick (1996), Abowd et al. (2000), Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (2000a, 2000b), 
Neumark and Wascher (2004), and Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005). For a recent review 
of this new literature see Neumark and Wascher (2007).   
Based on this new minimum wage literature Baicker and Levy (2007) and Yelowitz 
(2004, 2006) argue that pay or play mandates, which require employers to either provide 
appropriate health insurance for their workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the cost of 
health care, effectively increase the minimum wage for those workers whose hourly wage rate is 
below the prevailing minimum wage plus the tax. Baicker and Levy (2007) assuming a wage 
elasticity of -0.1 and using multiple years of Current Population Survey (CPS) data, estimate the 
employment effect of a nationwide pay or play mandate with an average $3.00 per hour tax on 
full time private sector workers (more than 20 hours per week), aged 22-65. They find that it 
would reduce the employment of those workers, whose hourly wage was below the size of the 
tax plus the prevailing state minimum wage by around 225,000.   
Baicker and Levy (2007) provide an important first step in evaluating the relative merits 
of pay or play legislation and demonstrate that, like minimum wage increases, pay or play 
mandates will reduce the employment of the least skilled workers in the work force.  But they do 
not focus on how the benefits of this legislation would be distributed across the income 
distribution or more specifically on how it would affect the working poor. 
Stigler (1946) also argued that “the connection between hourly wages and the standard of 
living of a family is remote and fuzzy. Unless the minimum wage varies with the amount of 
employment, numbers of earners, non-wage income, family size, and many other factors, it will be 
an inept device for combating poverty even for those who succeed in retaining employment. (p. 363)”  4
A smaller empirical literature has focused on who gains from minimum wage increases 
as well as how effective minimum wage increases have been in reducing poverty.  Here the 
evidence is overwhelming that, even assuming no negative employment effects of minimum 
wage increases, the vast majority of those who gain do not live in or even near officially 
measured poverty income levels. The reason for this finding, as suggested by Stigler, is that the 
majority of workers who gain from minimum wage increases are second or third earners in 
higher income households or single earners without families.  Furthermore, the majority of the 
working poor are not helped by such minimum wage increases because their wages are already 
above the proposed minimum. They are poor because they work too few hours. For examples of 
this literature, see: Burkhauser and Finegan (1989), Burkhauser, Couch, Wittenburg (1996), 
Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1996), and Neumark and Wascher (2001). 
 A more recent literature has shown that there is no relationship between state minimum 
wage increases and declines in state poverty rates. This empirical finding was first report by Card 
and Krueger (1995). Burkhauser and Sabia (2007) update and extend Card and Krueger (1995) 
and find that state minimum wage increases between 1998 and 2003 also had no significant 
affect on state poverty rates: overall; among the working poor; or even among single mothers.  
Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004, 2005) provide an explanation for these findings by 
showing that reductions in the employment and hours worked of low-wage workers in families 
just above the poverty line or the near poverty line (150 percent of the poverty line) result in their 
falling into poverty, or near poverty just enough to offset movements out of poverty or near 
poverty by the employment and wage gains in families just below these lines.    5
Here we use methods developed in this smaller distributional literature on the minimum 
wage to show how pay or play mandates would increase employer health insurance coverage 
across the income distribution.  
2. Background 
Over the last two decades, the extent of privately provided health insurance coverage in 
the United States has fallen from 70 to 63 percent of the non-aged population.
2 The latest 
numbers released by the Census Bureau shows among Americans of all ages, the percent with 
employment based coverage fell from 60.2 percent to 59.7 percent from 2005 to 2006 (Figure 7, 
DeNavas-Walt et al, 2007).  Researchers advance several reasons for this decline, including the 
rising cost of health care and the increasing generosity of public coverage (e.g. Cutler and 
Gruber 1996, Cutler and Madrian 1998. Kronick and Gilmer 1999, Cutler 2003, Baicker and 
Chandra 2006). This decline in privately provided health insurance is one reason for the call for 
government to require employers to either pay a tax to reimburse government for providing their 
workers with health insurance or play by providing health insurance for their workers that offset 
their tax payments.  
Another reason is the major success of grassroots efforts in increasing the minimum wage 
at the state level—in early 2007 before the passage of federal legislation to increase the 
minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour by 2009, the majority of state minimum wage rates 
were higher than the federal minimum (Employment Services Administration, 2006)—which has 
encouraged social progressives and others to push for similar wage based mandates to increase 
employer provided health insurance for low wage workers.    
                                                 
2 Author calculations using data in Fronstin (1986, 2005)   6
Employer health insurance mandates have been or are currently being considered by 31 
states.
3 Most of these laws are aimed at large firms (often over 10,000 employees) but some of 
the more comprehensive reform attempts considered or enacted by states such as Massachusetts, 
New York, Pennsylvania and California exempt only smaller firms. Legislation introduced in 
New York State (New York State Legislature, 2006) in 2006 would have mandated health 
insurance coverage by requiring firms to pay a tax of $3.00 per hour for all covered workers 
which could be offset by expenditures on health insurance for these workers.   But coverage was 
limited to workers with wage earnings of less than $600 per week ($15 per hour or less for those 
working 40 hours per week) in non-administrative or managerial jobs in firms with 100 or more 
employees, not involved in manufacturing or agriculture. 
Like legislation passed in the State of New York in 2004 which raised its minimum wage 
from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour, this pay or play mandate is premised on the notion that low wage 
workers are low income workers and hence need the help of the state to both raise their wages 
and increase their access to employer provide health insurance.  But as we have discussed above, 
this view is controversial.  It ignores negative employment effects of this type of wage based 
regulation as well as the fact that the vast majority of those helped by the 2004 New York 
minimum wage legislation did not live in or even near poverty. (See Burkhauser and Sabia 
2004.)   
Rather than focus on the potential consequences of New York’s specific pay or play 
mandate, we estimate the distributional and employment effects of more generic pay or play 
                                                 
3 These 31 states listed by the National Conference of State Legislatures are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm for details of states and laws covering the period 2005-
present.   7
mandates for the entire United States to demonstrate the mixed blessing such plans provide to the 
working poor and to show how critical coverage criteria—wage rate and firm size—are to the 
share of the working poor they will cover. 
3. Data and Methods
4 
 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics consists of a series of monthly surveys that annually capture among other things 
the income, wage earnings, hours of work and health insurance coverage of a random sample of 
approximately 150,000 non-institutionalized civilians.  It is the main source of official 
employment, income and health insurance coverage statistics in the United States. The CPS is a 
nationally representative sample of the United States population.   
We use data from several months of the 2005 CPS. We use the February 2005 CPS data 
to obtain information about the source of health insurance for each person in our sample. We 
then use March 2005 CPS data to obtain information on their family income and firm size, which 
is reported for the previous year—2004.
5 For those who report working in the February 2005 
CPS survey, we also obtain labor earnings data (to calculate hourly wages) from the March, 
April and May CPS surveys if they are part of the outgoing rotation in those months.
6  
Because pay or play mandates focus on the private sector, our sample consists of private 
sector, non-self employed workers. We include both part time workers (those working 20 hours 
or less per week) as well as full time workers. But we limit our sample to such workers aged 17-
64 to avoid the complications associated with high school students at younger ages and Medicare 
                                                 
4 Replication programs are available upon request. 
5 Family income is reported relative to the federal poverty level applicable to family size, thus it does not need to be 
adjusted for inflation from 2004 to 2005. But it must still be kept in mind that it applies to the previous year (2004). 
6 Those in the February survey during their 4
th or 8
th rotation month are not asked the supplemental questions on 
health insurance. Those in February during their 3
rd or 7
th rotation month go on to answer March questions, and their 
earnings data will be asked in the March outgoing rotation group survey too. But those of the 2
nd and 6
th groups (in 
February) will not answer earnings questions until April, and those of the 1
st and 5
th groups in February answer 
earnings questions in May.    8
coverage at older ages. Because we want to focus on whether or not our population of workers 
has health insurance and if so where it comes from, we exclude workers who do not report this 
information. But we re-weight our remaining workers to account for these missing workers. (See  
electronic data appendix accompanying this paper). All dollar values are reported as of February 
2005.  The family income variables available in the March CPS are already converted into 
income-to-needs values that represent multiples of the applicable family size poverty level. The 
use of income-to-needs ratios is standard practice in the income distribution literature in general 
and especially with respect to the minimum wage literature, since it allows comparisons across 
the available family income of persons in different size families. See Burkhauser and Sabia 
(2007) for a recent example.  
We describe the demographic characteristics of workers by insurance status in Appendix 
Table 1 and note that these statistics are similar to those in the literature (e.g. Fronstin, 2005). 
For a recent review of the literature on the uninsured, see Blumberg and Nichols (2002). We are 
not the first to match across multiple months of the CPS to assemble a data set for health 
insurance analysis (e.g. see Farber and Levy, 2000).  But the details of this data set are 
sufficiently complex to relegate full explanation to the electronic data appendix accompanying 
this paper.  
4. Results 
Table 1 subdivides our sample of all currently working non-self-employed private sector 
workers aged 17-64 (column 1) by whether they are without health insurance (column 2) or have 
coverage via their employer (column 3), as a dependent of a family member’s employer 
coverage (column 4), via purchase in the private market (column 5), or from government—
Medicare or Medicaid—(column 6).  As can be seen in row 1, the vast majority of private sector   9
workers have some form of health insurance.  One’s own employer is the major source of 
coverage (62.44 percent), followed by coverage as a dependent of a family member with 
employer insurance (16.43 percent).  The rest of the covered population purchases insurance in 
the private market (2.36 percent) or receives it from government (1.24 percent).  This leaves 
17.54 percent of the population without health insurance.  
  But health insurance coverage is not randomly distributed across this working population. 
As can be seen across the 4
th row of numbers, while only 24.90 percent of our entire sample 
works for small firms (firm size of 24 or fewer), these firms employ 43.19 percent of uninsured 
workers and only 16.60 percent of those workers with employer insurance.  Those who receive 
health insurance from the other three sources are also more likely to work for small firms. When 
we add the 43.19 percent of uninsured workers employed by small firms to the 16.16 percent 
who work for firms of 25 to 99 (row 5) we see that about 60 percent of uninsured workers would 
not be covered by the proposed New York pay or play mandate discussed above simply because 
it exempted firms of less than 100 workers from its mandate.  
  Health insurance coverage is also not randomly distributed across income categories. As 
rows 9 and 10 show, while only 4.42 percent of our sample of workers live in and 9.88 percent 
(4.42 plus 5.46) live in or near poverty (up to 150 percent of the poverty line), 13.33 (27.97) 
percent of those without health insurance live in (in or near) poverty. In contrast, only 1.71 (5.20) 
percent of those with employer health insurance live in (in or near) poverty. Those with health 
insurance as dependants or via the private market are also very unlikely to live in or near 
poverty. Those who receive health insurance from government are the most likely to live in 
(36.54 percent) or in and near poverty (58.51 percent).  While this distribution shows that   10
workers without any form of health insurance disproportionately live in poor or near poor 
families, pay or play mandates do not directly target the working poor for coverage.  
  Row 16 shows that health insurance is also correlated with hourly wage rate. While only 
8.58 percent of our sample has hourly wage rates of $5.00-$7.24, that is, workers whose wages 
will rise as the federal minimum wage rate increases from $5.15 in 2007 to $7.25 in 2009, 19.62 
percent of those without health insurance are in this hourly wage range. Only 3.19 percent of 
those with employer health insurance are in this range.  Workers in the other three health 
insurance groups are also more likely to be in this hourly wage range than are the uninsured. As 
row 17 shows, those without health insurance are also more likely to be in the $7.25-$10.24 hour 
wage range than are those with employer health insurance, as are the other three groups. 
(Appendix Table 2 reports the population sizes for values found in Table 1.)   
As we will discuss in more detail below, in a world where increases in wages have no 
negative effect on employment, the $3.00 per hour tax mandated by the New York pay or play 
proposal would provide its greatest individual benefit to those workers earning the minimum 
wage since the employer would bear the full burden of the tax.
7 In our simulations we assume 
that workers in the $5.00-$7.24 per hour range receive both an increase in their hourly wages to 
the new federal minimum of $7.25 and health insurance coverage costing $3.00 per hour that 
they do not pay for in reduced wages. Individual workers who would next best benefit in a world 
without negative employment effects, are those earning between $7.25-$10.24 since they will 
also receive health insurance costing $3.00 per hour but because the minimum wage is $7.25, 
their wage can not fall below $7.25, so their employer must pay the difference between the $3.00 
per hour cost of the insurance and the drop in their hourly wage rate. Those individuals earning 
                                                 
7 When the minimum wage increases to 7.25 in 2009, there will be fewer workers in this category (and more 
workers in higher wage categories) than implied in our simulations based on 2005 numbers because of wage growth 
between 2005 and 2009. We thank Linda Blumberg for pointing this out.   11
over $10.25 per hour and covered by the mandate will gain health insurance but will also see 
their hourly wages fall by $3.00 to pay for it, so at best they will be no better off. As can be seen 
in row 18, 24.04 percent of those without health insurance (wages of $10.25-$14.99) would fall 
into this category under the New York pay or play mandate. Since the New York mandate 
exempts workers who earn $15.00 per hour or more from coverage, as row 19 shows, 15.70 
percent of workers without health insurance would continue not to receive health insurance.     
  The correlations found in Table 1 show that those without health insurance are more 
likely to live in or near poverty, have lower hourly wages, and work for small firms than those 
with employer health insurance. But they also suggest that pay or play mandates may be a rather 
blunt way of ensuring that the working poor will gain health insurance.  It is to this question that 
we now turn.  
4.1 Mandates without Employment Effects.   
While pay or play mandates will have some effect on the 17.54 percent of workers in our 
sample who are uninsured, it will also have an important effect on the 20.03 percent of workers 
in our sample who have health insurance coverage but not from their employer. Because these 
two sub-populations without their own employer health insurance are different, we talk about the 
impact of federal pay or play mandates on them in turn.  
Our simulations below will not consider all proposed pay or play mandate designs which 
as discussed in footnote 3 vary substantially by state. Rather, we will focus on how the class of 
mandates which require employers to either provide appropriate health insurance for their 
workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the cost of health care impact on the employment and 
economic well being of workers in general and most especially on the working poor.   12
We first simulate the impact of a pay or play mandate which requires all large firms 
(those with 25 or more employees) to pay a $3.00 per hour tax on all their workers earning 
$15.00 per hour or less from which they can deduct the cost of providing their own health 
insurance.
8,9  In this simulation, we come close to the exclusion rules of the New York State pay 
or play mandate by including both a $15.00 per hour maximum and a firm size minimum 
limitation on coverage.  However, rather then choosing the 99 or fewer worker firm size 
exclusion in the New York State mandate we choose the less restrictive 24 or fewer worker firm 
size exclusion. Nonetheless we show that this exclusion will substantially reduce the share of 
uninsured workers who gain own employer provided health insurance under this mandate. This is 
especially so among the working poor and near poor since, as seen in Table 1, disproportional 
shares of them work for small firms.  
We conduct our simulation using our sample of CPS workers in 2005. We assume here 
that this mandate will have no behavioral effect on the employment or hours worked of all 
workers in our sample (i.e. we assume no unemployment effects).  We also assume that workers 
receiving employer health insurance from their firm are unaffected by this legislation. (That is, 
the cost of providing their health insurance to the firm exceeds the level mandated in this 
legislation.)  We further assume that all firms not providing health care prior to the mandate will 
choose to “pay” rather than “play”, i.e. purchase coverage for their employees themselves. And 
                                                 
8 Because there is some positive correlation between a worker’s hourly wage rate and his or her family income, pay 
or play legislation that increased coverage to higher hourly wage workers (e.g. in the extreme, covering all workers 
regardless of their hourly wage rate), would of course on the margin increase the share of the working poor 
population that was covered but would disproportionately do so for the non-poor population.  And, as we will 
discuss, it would do so in a way that effectively required all these higher wage workers to pay for this coverage via 
reductions in their hourly wage rates. 
9 At $3 per hour, assuming a 40 hour work week of 50 weeks a year will yield $6,000. In 2007, the average cost of a 
single policy is $4,479 and the cost of a family policy is $12,106 (KFF/HRET, 2007), thus $6,000 is more than the 
cost of a single health insurance policy but less than half the cost of a family policy when a mandate is implemented. 
To the extent that some of the policies paid for by the $3 tax will be family policies, we are not counting the 
additional dependents who might gain health insurance through this mandate. We thank Linda Blumberg for 
pointing this out.   13
that the government will use the resulting tax revenues from the mandate to provide health 
insurance to these same workers, resulting in a one to one correspondence between those who 
receive the coverage and those on behalf of whom the employer pays the fee.
10   We then assume 
that wages above the minimum wage are flexible and that the incidence of the pay or play tax on 
firms who do not provide health insurance will be borne entirely by the workers. Hence for 
workers whose hourly wage rate is $3.00 above the prevailing minimum wage, the net effect of 
the mandate will be that employers will reduce their hourly wage by $3.00.  But we also assume 
that the government will provide these covered workers with access to a government provided 
health care plan costing $3.00 per hour.
11  
Workers who earn hourly wages above the prevailing minimum wage but by less than 
$3.00 per hour will have their wages reduced to the prevailing minimum wage but will also 
receive government provided health insurance costing $3.00 per hour. Because in this example 
we are assuming no behavioral changes, each of these workers will be a beneficiary of this 
mandate since their total compensation—the prevailing minimum wage plus the value to them of 
their individual health insurance—is greater than their previous hourly wage.
12 
Finally, because our data is for 2005 it does not take into consideration the impact of the 
increase in the federal minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour that was enacted in 2007 and 
that will be fully implement in 2009. Here we assume that all workers earning below $5.00 per 
                                                 
10 Because firms must provide health insurance to all their workers if they provide it to some of their workers it is 
less costly for firms to pay the $3.00 tax. 
11  We assume throughout that pay or play legislation is structured in a way that makes employers and workers 
indifferent between paying or playing. If this is not the case and employer payments to the government are used to 
provide health insurance to the general uninsured population instead of to the workers on whose behalf employers 
paid the taxes, employers are likely to ‘play’ than ‘pay’ even if it requires them to provide health care to all their 
workers since at least in this way they and their workers recover part of the tax.  
12 This will only hold if they value the health insurance provided them at least at its effective cost to them which will 
vary from zero to $2.99 per hour. And as we will discuss below for those already covered by health insurance, if the 
value of the new insurance to them minus what they pay for it is at least as great as their value of their previous 
health insurance minus the cost of that insurance to them. We assume throughout that the employer does not have 
other means of requiring health insurance payments (such as co-premiums that are usually charged for health 
insurance, which would imply further out of pocket costs for the workers).   14
hour are not covered by the minimum wage—this assumption is common in the minimum wage 
literature and was made in Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007—and that they would not be covered 
under our federal pay or play mandate but that all other workers are covered by the federal 
minimum wage. Hence those earning $5.00-$7.24 per hour will have their wages increase to 
$7.25 under the new minimum wage increase, and they and all other workers earning $7.25-
$14.99 will also be covered by the $3.00 per hour pay or play mandate. Thus the effective 
minimum wage for all workers in our population will be $10.25, the sum of the new federal 
minimum wage plus the $3.00 per hour pay or play mandated tax on low wage laborers.   
 
Workers without Health Insurance.  Table 2 contains the 17.54 percent of our sample who 
have no health insurance.  The hourly wage of all these workers is shown across income-to-needs 
categories.  The 2.10 percent of these workers who currently earn less than $5.00 per hour (third 
column of numbers, second to last row) are assumed not to be covered by the minimum wage 
and would not be covered by our pay or play mandate even though they work in large firms. But 
all the workers in the next three wage categories who are in large firms will receive $3.00 per 
hour worth of health insurance coverage.  Workers in large firms earning between $5.00 and 
$7.24 (11.38 percent) will not only receive health insurance coverage but will see their hourly 
wages go up to $7.25 based on increases in the federal minimum wage. Workers in large firms 
earning between $7.25 and $10.25 (22.13 percent) will see their wages fall to $7.25 but will now 
receive $3.00 per hour worth of health insurance coverage. If these workers value their health 
insurance costing $3.00 per hour by more than the cost to them of a reduction in their hourly 
wage to $7.25, they will be better off.  Workers in large firms earning between $10.25 and 
$14.99 (12.71 percent), will receive health insurance but will also see their wages fall by $3.00   15
per hour to pay for it. The 15.70 percent of workers earning $15.00 per hour or more will not be 
affected by these mandates.  
Hence, overall only a minority (46.22 percent) of uninsured workers will be receiving 
employer health insurance coverage under this mandate.  While the working poor, those with 
income-to-needs values equal to 1 or less (row 1) are disproportionately represented in the hourly 
wage range where net compensation costs increase ($5.00-$10.25) as seen in column 14, they 
nevertheless make up a small share (18.74 percent) of all workers whose health insurance is 
subsidized by their employer.  Only 35.36 percent of newly covered worker in this subsidized 
category are either living in poor or near poor families, while 45.35 percent live in families that 
are twice the poverty rate or more.   
When we include workers in the $10.25-$14.99 who pay for their new health insurance 
coverage themselves, we find that the working poor make up 15.56 percent and the poor and near 
poor make up 31.12 percent of the total population of uninsured workers covered while those 
twice the poverty line or more make up 51.47 percent of this population (column 15).  While the 
vast majority (53.95 percent, column 16) of the working poor without health insurance would 
now be covered under this mandate, 46.05 would not, primarily because they work in small 
firms. In addition, another 6.84 percent of the working poor would effectively be required to 
fully pay for this health insurance since they earn more than $10.25 per hour.  
Other Insured Workers.  Table 3 contains the 20.03 percent of our sample whose health 
insurance comes from sources other than their employer.  The vast majority of these workers 
(16.43 percent) are covered on the employer provided insurance of another family member.
13  As 
we saw in Table 1 this is a very different population than the population without health 
                                                 
13 Of those with dependent coverage, 75 percent are insured through a spouse and 25 percent through another family 
member (almost all of whom appear to be a parent because 94 percent of this population is under 25 years of age).   16
insurance. The overwhelming majority do not live in or even near poverty. This should not be 
surprising since, as we also saw in Table 1, the vast majority of workers who have employer 
provided health insurance are neither poor or near poor. And by definition these workers live in a 
family that includes a worker with employer health insurance in addition to this worker.  
Another 2.36 percent of this population of workers with health insurance from another source 
purchases their health insurance in the private market and as we also saw in Table 1 an even 
smaller share of this population live in a poor or near poor family. It is only the remaining 1.24 
percent of this population that receive their health insurance from Medicare or Medicaid that are 
much more likely to live in or near poverty.   
Thus overall, only 5.04 percent of these workers whose health insurance comes from 
another source live in poor families and only 8.58 percent live in families in or near poverty.  
While a substantial share of these workers have hourly wage earnings of between $5.00 and 
$10.25 per hour very few of this low wage group are either poor or near poor. The weak 
relationship between the level of the hour wage rate and the level of the income-to-needs ratio in 
this population is the starkest example of Stigler’s argument that hourly wage rates are a poor 
proxy for economic well being.  Only 15.83 percent of the workers who will gain subsidized own 
employer coverage in this population live in poor or near poor families while 41.30 percent live 
in families four times or more the poverty line and 77.71 percent live in families two times or 
more the poverty line.  The percentages are even starker for the entire population of workers who 
move into pay or play mandated health insurance plans—6.77 percent are poor and 5.38 percent 
are near poor while 47.74 percent have income four times the poverty line and 82.35 percent 
have income two times the poverty line.     17
  But even among this broader group of workers it is far from clear how many will gain 
from this mandate.  The vast majority were already covered by the employer provided health 
insurance of another family member. Because in this simulation we are assuming no 
disemployment effects, those earning $5.00-$7.24 will be no worse off since their wages will not 
fall. But unless the value to them of their new health insurance plus their family savings from no 
longer being a dependent on their other family member’s employer provided health insurance 
plan is greater than the value of that plan, they will be no better off.
14  Those earning $7.25-
$10.24 are even less likely to gain from this coverage since they will have to pay for part of it via 
the reduction of their hourly wage rate to $7.25 per hour. And those earning $10.25-$14.99 are 
the least likely to gain from this coverage since they will have to pay $3.00 per hour, the full cost 
of the coverage via reduced wages.   
  It is more likely that those newly covered workers who formerly purchased their health 
insurance in the private market will benefit assuming no behavioral effects since their private 
market insurance costs were relatively high. But once again, the value of the employer based 
health insurance coverage to the worker plus the cost of his/her private market health insurance 
would have to be greater than the value to him/her of the private market health insurance. 
  For the 1.24 percent of workers who were receiving their health insurance from Medicare 
or Medicaid and are now mandated to receive it from their employer, the share who will gain is 
likely to be very small, even when we assume they experience no loss of employment. The 
reason is that they already are receiving government provided health insurance. This will 
                                                 
14 As a general equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, our study does not capture several second 
order effects that might occur as a result of pay or play mandates. For example, our partial equilibrium analysis does 
not take into account increased employment in other sectors that might result from a change in the relative prices of 
goods and services due to the change in the cost of labor in firms affected by the pay or play mandates. We also do 
not speculate on how pay or play legislation would mandate which firm would be responsible for covering children 
in the case of dual worker families, or the coverage of non-worker spouses. These all represent areas for future 
research.   18
especially be the case for the 16.94 percent who must now pay the full cost of their health 
insurance since they earn $10.25-$14.99 per hour. 
4.2 Mandates including Employment Effects. 
  Based on the new minimum wage literature discussed above, Baicker and Levy (2007) 
and Yelowitz (2006) argue that pay or play mandates increase the minimum wage for workers 
whose hourly wage rate is below the prevailing minimum wage plus the tax. In this section we 
assume the elasticity of demand for covered workers with respect to an increase in their wages 
caused by, in the case of workers earning less than $7.25 per hour, a combination of a federal 
minimum wage increase to $7.25 per hour together with a pay or play mandate of an additional 
$3.00 per hour for health insurance coverage, is -0.2.
15 For such workers the combined increase 
can vary from $3.01 to $5.25 per hour depending on their initial wage rate.  
We assume the same elasticity of demand for all workers earning $7.25-$10.24 per hour.  
Since they are already at or above the new minimum wage per hour at the time of the simulation, 
this group will experience pay or play mandated increases of between $0.01 and $3.00 per hour. 
Because we assume that wages are flexible downward to the new federal minimum wage, there 
is no employment effect on workers who were earning $10.25-$14.99 at the time of the 
simulation. Those earning $15.00 or more are not eligible for our simulated pay or play 
mandated benefits nor are those in firms of less than 25 workers.  
Our simulate results below are consistent with all the assumptions discussed in Table 2 
except that now we are accounting for the negative employment effects of a combined increase 
in the federal minimum wage to $7.25 and a $3.00 per hour pay or play mandate on our working 
population.  This simulation like the one in Table 2 comes closest to the exclusion rules of the 
New York State pay or play mandate by including both a maximum hourly wage rate and a 
                                                 
15 We later show estimates that assume a range of elasticities from -0.1 to -0.3   19
minimum firm size limitation on coverage. But again rather then choosing the 99 or fewer 
worker firm size exclusion in the New York State mandate we choose the less restrictive 24 or 
fewer worker firm size exclusion.    
The first panel of Table 4 focuses on workers without any form of health insurance who 
earn $5.00-$10.24 per hour in firms who employ 25 workers or more and provide no health 
insurance. We focus on this population, since those workers earning less than $5.00 or more than 
$15.00 per hour are not covered by the policy, and those earning $10.25-$14.99 do not 
experience a decrease in employment because of the policy since their hourly wages are flexible 
downward.  As discussed above, this is the population who will receive employer subsidized 
health insurance under this pay or play mandate.  
Within the $5.00-$10.24 per hour wage category, we distinguish between those who will 
be effected by both the increase in the federal minimum wage to $7.25 (those earning $5.00-
$7.24) and the pay or play mandate and those who will only be effected by the pay or play 
mandate (those earning $7.25-$10.25).  The distribution of workers in these hourly wage 
categories are shown across income-to-needs categories. In each hourly wage earning/income-to-
needs cell of Table 4 we individually show the number of workers in that cell who will lose their 
job and the number who will keep their job and gain subsidized health insurance coverage 
because of the policy. 
We estimate the number of workers who will lose their jobs in each cell by summing the 
probability of each member of that cell losing their job (the difference between $10.25 per hour 
and their current wage divided by their current wage multiplied by -0.2) using population 
weights to display results in terms of the U.S. labor force affected within our population—
currently working non-self employed private sector workers aged 17-64. The number of workers   20
who will be covered by the policy is the difference between the total population subject to the 
policy and the number unemployed in that cell.  
While the percent increase in wages can vary from 41 to 125 percent in the $5.00-$7.24 
cells because of the joint impact of the federal minimum wage and the pay or play mandate, our 
conservative assumption about demand elasticity yields individual risks of unemployment from 
8.2 to 25 percent and hence relatively modest disemployment effects in each of the income-to-
needs cells in Table 4. The number of unemployed workers in the $7.25-$10.24 cells is more 
modest since the percentage change in hourly wage levels is smaller. Yet as can be seen in the 
last column of Table 4 the percentage of poor (9.01 percent) and near poor (7.45 percent) 
workers who lose their jobs because of the policy is not trivial and is greater than for other 
workers since they have lower initial wage rates.  Overall 153,865 poor or near poor workers 
without health insurance coverage will lose their jobs because of this policy (column 5). The 
total number of workers without health insurance who will lose their jobs because of this policy 
is 386,734.  
The second panel of Table 4 focuses on the rest of the population of effected workers—those 
workers with some form of health insurance who earn $5.00-$10.24 per hour in firms who 
employ 25 workers or more and provide no health insurance. The results for this population are 
similar to those above. As can be seen in the last column, the poor (8.71 percent) and near poor 
(8.50 percent) experience a greater negative employment effect than the rest of the covered 
population in this panel since they have lower initial hourly wage rates.  Overall, 63,555 poor or 
near poor workers who are mandated to switch to their employer’s health insurance plan from 
another source of health insurance will lose their jobs because of this policy.  The total number 
of workers in this category who will lose their job is 363,443.   21
The third panel of Table 4 sums the employment and coverage effects of these policies 
across the combined populations of the top two panels. The bottom line is that this policy will 
increase the subsidized own employer coverage of 10,007,413 workers earning $5.00 and $10.25 
who did not have this type of coverage before.  However, it will do so at the expense of 750,178 
workers who will lose their jobs because of this policy coming into effect along with an increase 
in the minimum wage to $7.25 per hour.  Furthermore, another 4,696,615 of these “newly 
ensured” workers would effectively be mandated to give up their previous health insurance 
coverage for this new own employer provided health insurance coverage. 
4.3 The Net Result of the Policy on Health Insurance Coverage and Its Sources 
In this section we show the sensitivity of our results to our demand elasticity assumptions. 
Table 5 shows the net effect of an increase of the federal minimum wage to $7.25 together with a 
pay or play mandate of the type discussed in Table 4 on total health insurance coverage and the 
sources of that coverage assuming elasticities of demand of: -0.1, -0.2, and -0.3. 
Our sample represents 96,940,624 non-self employed private sector workers aged 17-64 in 
2005. As can be seen in row 1, the vast majority of these workers (60,528,322) have employer 
health insurance. The rest do not. But of those without employer health insurance coverage, the 
majority are covered in some other way—15,924,349 as a dependent on another family 
member’s employer health care plan, 2,283,490 purchase their health insurance in the private 
market, and 1,200,405 receive it from government. The remaining 17,004,056 workers have no 
health insurance. 
Row 2 shows how the distribution of health insurance changes when we introduce the play 
or pay mandate discussed in Table 4 assuming a demand elasticity of -0.2.  Such a mandate will   22
increase own employer health care coverage by 14,932,865 (to 75,461,187 in Row 3).
16 While 
part of the increase in own employer coverage comes from a decline in workers with no health 
insurance coverage, the majority comes from shifts of workers from other forms of health 
insurance coverage to mandated own employer health insurance coverage.  This increase in 
health insurance coverage, as discussed in Table 4 comes at the cost of 750,178 lost jobs.  
Furthermore, as can be seen in row 3, while this policy will reduce the number of workers 
without any form of health insurance, 9,145,034 workers will continue not to be covered by any 
form of health insurance because of the wage maximum and firm size minimum exclusions in 
the policy. 
Rows 4 and 5 repeat the simulation but assume elasticities of -0.1 and -0.3 respectively.  As 
can be seen, the change in own employer provided health insurance and in those who lose their 
jobs due to the mandate are sensitive to the demand elasticity used in the simulation.  Assuming 
a demand elasticity of -0.1 halves the number of workers who lose their jobs to 325,089. 
Assuming a demand elasticity of -0.3 doubles the number to 1,125,267. 
To summarize the tradeoff posed by the mandate policy, we calculate two ratios. One is the 
number of workers who lose their jobs for every 100 workers made newly insured by this policy. 
For this calculation, we only consider those workers who switch from no insurance to employer 
insurance as those who switch between insurance categories are not part of the newly insured. 
We find that in this population 10.03 workers lose their jobs (at an elasticity of -0.2) for every 
100 newly covered workers. But many of these newly covered workers fully pay for their health 
insurance via reductions in their hourly wage of $3.00. Hence we repeat this exercise but focus 
only on these newly covered workers whose health insurance is subsidized under this mandate 
                                                 
16 Note that in our assumption this increase is actually in government provided health insurance that is purchased 
from the tax on these newly covered workers whose final incidence will depend on their initial hourly wage rate.   23
(those in the wage range $5.00-$10.25 per hour). We find that for every 100 workers newly 
eligible for subsidized health insurance, 14.12 workers lose their jobs. 
The first 5 rows of data in Table 5 show the sensitivity of our results in our entire sample to 
different elasticity assumptions. In the remaining rows we focus on how this policy impacts the 
working poor. We do so assuming a demand elasticity of -0.2. The sixth to eighth row of 
numbers in Table 5 show respectively for the working poor: the initial number of workers in 
each of the health insurance categories before the policy; the net change in each of the health 
insurance categories after the policy; and the number of workers who remain in those categories 
after the policy. While a pay or play mandate will increase the number of the working poor with 
employer health care coverage by 1,627,551, approximately 493,260
17 of these newly covered 
workers were already receiving health insurance from some other source. So the total number of 
newly covered working poor amounts to 1,134,291. But providing these new covered workers 
with health insurance comes at the cost of 124,745 of the working poor losing their job---a ratio 
of 11 jobs lost by poor workers for every 100 newly covered poor workers.  Furthermore, after 
the policy, 27.3 percent of the working poor (1,168,075) still do not have health insurance.
18 
5. Summary and Conclusion   
We provide evidence that pay or play mandates, which require employers to either 
provide appropriate health insurance for their workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the cost 
of health care, are a very blunt instrument for providing health insurance for the working poor. 
Like minimum wage increases meant to help the working poor, pay or play mandates attempt to 
identify the targeted low income group via their wage rate rather directly via their family’s 
                                                 
17 This calculation takes into account those who are made uninsured and unemployed. 
18 ((1,043,300+124,745)/4,281,308))   24
income. But even more so, by limiting their coverage to larger firms, these pay or play mandates 
disproportionately exclude the working poor from this coverage.  
Furthermore, like the minimum wage, these pay or play mandates force employers to 
provide compensation above the competitive market price for low skilled workers and hence will 
reduce the employment of precisely the group of low income workers least able to compete in 
the market that the program was intended to help.  For this group of 124,745 poor workers 
identified in our simulation, pay or play mandates not only fail to bring them employer provided 
health insurance but also take away their job.  Our results are of course sensitive to our 
assumptions. So for instance, to the extent that revenues from pay or play mandates on 
employers are not required to fully pay the cost of these mandated health insurance policies for 
their workers, the negative employment impacts of these mandates would be smaller.  But doing 
so would require additional funding from someplace. And, it would not change the general 
conclusions about the distributional effects of these pay or play mandates. 
Finally, pay or play mandates are blunt instruments for increasing the overall health 
insurance coverage of workers because they impact both those who have no health insurance and 
those whose health insurance comes from other sources.  Thus a large share of the increase in 
own employer health insurance coverage produced by pay or play mandates comes at the 
expense of workers (including the working poor) who are already covered by other sources of 
health insurance and are not likely to be better off because of this shift.  This is the case not only 
because some of these workers will lose their jobs but also because others will now be forced 
into a health insurance plan that is less advantageous to them than their previous situation. 
  An analysis of alternative policy options to increase employment based coverage is 
beyond the scope of our paper, but one possible tool to consider is a health insurance version of   25
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). This may have distributional advantages relative to 
minimum wage increases as a mechanism for subsidizing the wage earnings of the working poor 
along many dimensions.  (See: Burkhauser, Couch, and Andrew J. Glenn, 1996; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2001). For example,  the minimum wage is likely to reduce employment because it 
raises the cost to firms of hiring low skilled laborers, but the EITC provides a government 
subsidy through the tax system to low income workers hence increasing their labor supply, 
increasing employment, and reducing their dependence on welfare (Hotz and Sholz, 2003; Hotz, 
Mullin, and Sholz, 2006).  In addition, because it targets beneficiaries based on family income 
rather than an individual’s hourly wage, a greater share of its benefits go to the working poor. 
Thus an earned health insurance tax credit that would cover the cost of a health insurance policy 
modeled on the EITC should be studied in greater detail to compare its merits relative to 
employer paid mandates.  
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Table 1. Firm size, Income and Wage Characteristics by Insurance Status 
 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors. 
 
 
  All  Uninsured  Own employer  Dependent  Non group  Publicly insured 
     (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Weighted Percent    100.00 17.54 62.44 16.43  2.36  1.24 
Number of observations  23,594 3,781 14,808 4,141  560  304 
Population count (Millions)  96.94 17.00  60.53  15.92  2.28  1.20 
Column Percentages 
Firm size  24 or fewer workers  24.90  43.19  16.60  32.94  49.01  31.82 
  25 to 99 workers  14.94  16.16  14.46  14.95  15.88  19.43 
  100 to 499 workers  15.36  11.84  17.09  13.80  7.74  12.90 
  More than 500 workers  44.81  28.81  51.85  38.31  27.37  35.84 
Total (all firm size)    100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Income-to-Needs Ratio  Less than 100  4.42  13.33  1.71  2.77  4.34  36.54 
 100-149  5.46  14.65  3.49  1.88  5.43  21.97 
 150-199  7.28  15.15  5.86  3.26  10.91  13.89 
 200-299  16.97  23.62  16.37  12.63  16.32  11.75 
 300-399  16.74  13.56  17.78  16.32  21.62  5.66 
 400  or  more  49.14  19.70  54.79  63.14  41.39  10.20 
Total (all incomes)    100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Wage category  $0-$4.99  1.86  4.15  0.66  3.08  4.21  8.94 
 $5.00-$7.24  8.58  19.62  3.19  15.79  6.01  32.86 
 $7.25-$10.24  19.61  36.49  13.42  23.04  26.86  33.57 
 $10.25-$14.99  25.50  24.04  26.61  23.78  23.69  16.94 
  $15.00 and above  44.45  15.70  56.12  34.30  39.23  7.70 
Total (all wages)     100.00 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00   30
 
Table 2. Firm Size and Wage Distribution of Uninsured Workers by the Income-to-Needs Ratio of Their Family (2005)
         
Small (less than 25) vs. Large (greater than or equal to 25) Firm, by 
Wage category         
Wage 















Ratio N                    
Less 
than 100 2,265,837 13.33 4.03* 1.34* 14.38 21.46 14.60 25.65 6.87  6.84 2.72*  2.11*  100  18.7  15.56  53.95 
100-150  2,490,723 14.65 2.24* 2.09* 12.16 12.63 17.96 25.39 10.37 11.07 3.15* 2.94*  100 16.6  15.56  49.09 
150-200  2,575,926 15.15 2.47* 1.11* 7.68  10.16 15.67 32.51 9.68  10.50 4.55* 5.67  100 19.3  17.42  53.16 
200-300  4,015,531 23.62 1.52* 3.31* 6.80  10.98 13.96 21.16 15.30 13.09 7.34  6.54  100 22.7  23.11  45.23 
300-400  2,306,138 13.56 1.25* 2.89* 5.63  8.64 13.02  17.44 12.03 18.18 8.96  11.96  100 10.6  12.99  44.26 
400 or 




17,004,057  100.00  2.05  2.10  8.24  11.38 14.37 22.13 11.32 12.71 7.21  8.49  100 100  100  46.22 
Median wage     3.10  3.05  6.45  6.45  8.87  8.63  12.33  12.08  19.73  20.03             
Note:   A star denotes a cell size of less than 25.  Shading shows those who would be made insured by the policy.   
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors. 
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Table 3. Firm Size and Wage Distribution of Other Insured Workers by the Income-to-Needs Ratio of Their Family (2005) 
         
Small (less than 25) vs. Large (greater than or equal to 25) Firm, 
by Wage category         
Wage 











category   Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large Small Large Small Large         
Income 
-to-Needs 
Ratio N                     
Less than 
100  978,034 5.04 6.23*  5.11*  16.14  19.75 9.75  26.87 5.66* 7.55* 0.79* 2.15*  100  9.01  6.77  54.17 
100-150  686,881 3.54 1.77*  4.16*  10.00*  21.98 9.72  28.25 6.67* 11.00* 3.05*  3.41*  100  6.82  5.38  61.22 
150-200  934,860 4.82 1.59*  4.66*  6.48*  12.01 15.11 22.95 8.57  11.08 7.22  10.34  100  6.46  5.50  46.04 
200-300  2,524,975 13.01  1.77*  2.17  6.15  13.22 10.95 24.50 10.51 13.75 7.95  9.03  100  18.82  16.61  51.47 
300-400  3,160,630 16.28  1.03*  2.83*  5.63  11.13 9.61  17.04 11.46 16.39 10.04 14.84  100  17.59  18.00  44.56 
400 or 




19,408,246  100.00  1.34 2.24 5.44 10.26  8.33 15.81  9.10 14.24  10.56  22.68  100 100.00  100  40.31 
Median wage     3.27 2.85 6.41 6.41 8.87 8.87 12.40 12.81 20.78 22.35           
Note:    A star denotes a cell size of less than 25.  Shading shows those who would be made insured by the policy. 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors. 
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Table 4, Panel A. Firm Size and Wage Distribution of Unemployment Effect for Uninsured 
Workers by the Income-to-Needs Ratio of Their Family (2005) 
Assuming -0.2 elasticity  $5.00-$7.24  $7.25-$10.24     







Income-to-Needs Ratio              
Less than 100  -61,846  424,353  -26,369  554,914 -88,216  979,267 -9.01 
100-149  -39,201  275,468  -26,448  605,933 -65,649  881,401 -7.45 
150-199  -30,861  230,835  -32,715  804,605 -63,576  1,035,440  -6.14 
200-299  -54,445  386,608  -33,110  816,491 -87,555  1,203,099  -7.28 
300-399  -25,130  174,063  -12,880  389,312 -38,010  563,375 -6.75 
400 or more  -27,093  205,161  -16,636  443,055 -43,729  648,216 -6.75 
Total  -238,576 1,696,488-148,158 3,614,310-386,734 5,310,798  -7.28 
Panel B. Firm Size and Wage Distribution of Unemployment Effect for Workers with 
either dependent, individual or public coverage, by the Income-to-Needs Ratio of Their 
Family  (2005) 
Assuming -0.2 elasticity  $5.00-$7.24  $7.25-$10.24     







Income-to-Needs  Ratio             
Less than 100  -25,879  167,234  -10,650  252,154 -36,529  419,388 -8.71 
100-149  -18,751  132,240  -8,275  185,742 -27,026  317,982 -8.50 
150-199  -15,045  97,253  -8,579  205,992 -23,624  303,245 -7.79 
200-299  -41,959  291,789  -24,177  594,480 -66,135  886,269 -7.46 
300-399  -44,147  307,552  -18,828  519,651 -62,976  827,203 -7.61 
400 or more  -104,669  744,213  -42,484  1,198,315-147,153 1,942,528  -7.58 
Total  -250,450 1,740,281-112,993  2,956,334-363,443  4,696,615  -7.74 
Panel C. Firm Size and Wage Distribution of Unemployment Effect for Workers with 
either no insurance, dependent, individual or public coverage, by Income-to-Needs Ratio of 
Their Family (2005) 
Assuming -0.2 elasticity  $5.00-$7.24  $7.25-$10.24     







Income-to-Needs  Ratio             
Less than 100  -87,725  591,587 -37,020  807,068 -124,745  1,398,655 -8.92 
100-149  -57,952  407,708 -34,722  791,675 -92,675  1,199,383 -7.73 
150-199  -45,906  328,088  -41,294 1,010,596 -87,200 1,338,684  -6.51 
200-299  -96,404 678,397  -57,287  1,410,971 -153,690  2,089,368  -7.36 
300-399  -69,277  481,616 -31,709  908,963 -100,986  1,390,579 -7.26 
400 or more  -131,762 949,374  -59,120 1,641,370 -190,882  2,590,744  -7.37 
Total  -489,027  3,436,769 -261,151 6,570,644 -750,178 10,007,413  -7.50 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors.   1
Table 5. Summary of Pay or Play Mandate Outcomes across Insurance Groups  
























5  0 
Change due to policy 
(elasticity -0.2)  0  14,932,86
5  -7,859,022 -6,450,671 -694,709 -678,641 750,178 
Final distribution 
(elasticity -0.2)  96,940,623 75,461,18
7  9,145,034 9,473,678 1,588,782521,764 750,178 
Final distribution 
(elasticity -0.1)  96,940,623 75,836,27
6  9,145,034 9,473,678 1,588,782521,764 375,089 
Final distribution 
(elasticity -0.3)  96,940,623 75,086,09
8  9,145,034 9,473,678 1,588,782521,764 1,125,267 
            
        
 
By Income-to-Needs 
Ratio            
Less than 100% FPL            
Initial distribution  4,281,308 1,037,438 2,265,837  440,454  99,005  438,574  0 
Change due to policy 
(elasticity -0.2)  0 1,627,551 -1,222,507 -224,429  -55,675  -249,685  124,745 
Final distribution  4,281,308 2,664,989 1,043,330  216,025  43,330  188,890  124,745 
For every worker made newly insured, 0.11 workers loose 
employment        
            
            
            
            
        
 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors.  2
Appendix Table 1. Characteristics by Insurance Category 
 
   All Uninsured Own  employer  Dependent Nongroup Publi
   (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Weighted Percent  100  17.54 62.44 16.43  2.36 
Age  (years)  39.13 34.91 41.02 36.66  39.86 
Female    0.46  0.42 0.42 0.64  0.49 
Number of kids in the family  0.88  0.94  0.81  1.07  0.73 
Female head with children  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.01  0.06 
Hours  worked  39.51 37.06 42.03 33.21  36.52 
Part  time    0.07  0.10 0.01 0.24  0.18 
Full  time    0.93  0.90 0.99 0.76  0.82 
Weeks worked last year  49.18 46.83  50.68  46.56  48.02 
Whether employer offered  0.81  0.36  1.00  0.66  0.35 
Whether  was  eligible  0.75  0.22 1.00 0.50  0.18 
Race  White  0.83  0.80 0.83 0.88  0.89 
  Black  0.10  0.13 0.10 0.06  0.06 
  Other  0.07  0.07 0.06 0.06  0.05 
Education  HSDO  0.11  0.27 0.06 0.12  0.05 
  HS    0.31  0.38 0.30 0.27  0.31 
  More than HS but less than college (4 yr) 0.31  0.26  0.31  0.37  0.32 
  College or more  0.27  0.09  0.33  0.24  0.31 
Marital  status  Married  0.59  0.44 0.61 0.73  0.50 
  Widowed, divorced or separated  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.02  0.19 
  Never  married  0.27  0.40 0.23 0.25  0.31 
 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors.  3
Appendix Table 2. Firm size, Income and Wage Characteristics by Insurance Status 
Source:  CPS data estimated by the authors. 










   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 






Totals          
Firm size  24 or fewer 
workers 
24,136,35
3 7,344,122 10,045,628 5,245,560 1,119,063 381,980
  25 to 99 workers  14,478,22
4 2,747,627 8,753,518 2,381,098 362,720 233,261
  100 to 499 
workers 
14,887,73
0 2,012,671 10,346,361 2,197,041 176,757 154,900
  More than 500 
workers 
43,438,31
7 4,899,636 31,382,816 6,100,651 624,950 430,264






Less than 100 
4,281,308 2,265,837 1,037,438 440,454 99,005 438,574
Income-to-Needs 
Ratio 
100-149  5,288,444 2,490,723 2,110,840 299,222 123,973 263,686
 150-199  7,055,895 2,575,926 3,545,108 518,936 249,176 166,748
 200-299  16,449,44
0 4,015,531 9,908,934 2,011,404 372,573 140,999
 300-399  16,228,54
4 2,306,138 10,761,775 2,599,071 493,624 67,935





   1,801,194 705,939 400,814 490,936 96,184 107,322
Wage category  $0-$4.99  8,312,821 3,336,110 1,930,206 2,514,862 137,245 394,398
 $5.00-$7.24  19,012,99
8 6,205,574 8,121,699 3,669,526 613,252 402,948
 $7.25-$10.24  24,722,32
0 4,087,051 16,104,758 3,786,229 540,969 203,313
 $10.25-$14.99  43,091,29
1 2,669,383 33,970,846 5,462,797 895,840 92,424
 $15.00  and 
above 
43,091,29
1 2,669,383 33,970,846 5,462,797 895,840 92,424
Notes: The population numbers are obtained by summing the supplemental weights in each category, after re-
weighting to adjust for missing data. 
The weights in the CPS are created to symbolize roughly the number of people represented by that observation 